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ABSTRACT 
This article investigates spectatorship of screen media. Early screen media is often thought to necessitate 
passive spectatorship, with thinkers such as Siegfried Kracauer (1987) and Walter Benjamin (2004) focusing 
on film. Such theories are later supported by critiques such as those by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer 
(2003) on the mass media, and Laura Mulvey’s (2004) text on the gaze in film, along with ideas around the 
flaws of the Cartesian position as spectatorship formulated in aesthetics. More recently, with the advent of 
digital media, spectatorship has been re-formulated as more active in terms of meaning making. Following 
earlier theorists, I argue here that screen spectatorship is not in fact as active as it now appears to be, and 
that spectators are often performing dialectical zombie-like spectatorship; appearing active when spectatorship 
is more distracted than before. Overwhelming spectacle catering to the ‘eye lust’ (Gunning 2004:871) and 
interactive elements convince spectators that they are acting with agency, but as I aim to show, also lead to 
an exacerbated collapse of contemplative distance, which paradoxically often renders spectatorship uncannily 
zombie-like. When spectatorship reveals itself as a strangely passive activity, it may be understood as 
uncanny in the manner that Freud (1955) formulated it. 
Keywords: Uncanny, Zombie, Active spectatorship, Passive spectatorship, ‘Curiositas’, Interactivity, 
Active and passive spectatorship of screen media
Early film has been historically critiqued by authors such as Siegfried Kracauer (1987) and Walter 
Benjamin (2004), as leading to spectatorship of distraction, as opposed to the absorption associated 
with the spectatorship of art (Gunning 2004:871). Critical thinkers of the Frankfurt School such as 
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer (2003), as well as feminist theorists such as Laura Mulvey 
(2004), later critiqued both film and television as facilitating a passive mode of spectatorship, in a 
sense imposing representation on spectators in a way which did not encourage them to question 
such representations. On the other hand, contemporary spectatorship of screen media is also 
often seen as more active, with spectators participating in the process of constructing meaning 
from representation. This supposedly challenges the model of the passive Cartesian1 spectator of 
art history, to whom the world is administered through ready-made representation. There are many 
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theories on how digital media allows the spectator to become an author and how meaning is created 
in a more interactive manner (Daly 2010:81-98; Haraway 1991; Mitchell 1992). The spectator or user is 
thought to participate in a process rather than to receive an end product, because the digital medium 
allows for input at many stages of spectatorship. Spectatorship is thus often seen as having shifted 
from a passive position through the ‘decentering’ of the Cartesian subject in various strategies 
employed by digital screen media (Oudshoorn & Pinch 2003:1-14). ‘Decentering the subject’ is not 
limited to the spectatorship of screen media, it is extensively theorised in the spectatorship of 
contemporary art, found in numerous postmodern interpretations of spectatorship including those 
relating to semiotic models, and many deconstructionist and critical approaches to understanding 
the visual world; challenging the modernist notions of Cartesian rationalism (Kando 1996). Stuart 
Hall (1973), John Fiske and John Hartley (2003:1-20) and David Morley (1993) have argued for the 
active spectatorship of visual culture (which includes but is not limited to screen media). Thus the 
notion of spectatorship is much wider than the spectatorship of screen media and it is entrenched 
in and often struggling against aesthetic notions of the Cartesian subject. 
Throughout this article reference is made to screen-based media or screen media, as well as 
spectatorship related to these categories, which are to be understood as including projected 
screen media, analogue or broadcast screen media such as television, and digital screen media 
of many kinds, such as digital televisions, computer displays and mobile phones, and the newer 
touch screen phones and ‘tablets’. Often spectatorship of screen media is seen as participatory, 
or active, implying agency and even authorial aspects. In this article this is implied when the words 
participatory or active are used. Passive spectatorship refers to a model where the viewer receives 
fixed and manufactured meaning, such as the Cartesian position implies. 
Contrary to some of the positions I have mentioned above, which advocate active spectatorship of 
screen media, I would like to argue here that spectatorship is not as emancipated as it would seem 
in the context of various ‘new media’, and that many of the points made by Benjamin and Adorno 
remain more valid than they are generally thought to be, although these authors were not writing 
about digital screen media. Spectatorship seems to be less about the spectator actively making 
meaning, than him or her being sensually overwhelmed and distracted, although these devices 
allow him or her to feel active. A dialectical approach, such as the one followed by Kracauer and 
later Adorno, allows one to think of screen media spectatorship as potentially uncanny. While the 
concept of the uncanny is usually linked with new (strange) technologies of looking, such as Benjamin, 
according to Miriam Hansen (1987:179-224), Hansen and Tom Gunning (2004:36-60) do, or with the 
content of screen media, such as horror films (Allen 1993:21-48; Mitchell 2005:55), I want to argue 
that aspects of screen spectatorship as practice may be seen as uncanny. A popularised fear of 
screen media is that they dehumanise spectators (Williams 1988:381-394), or turn them into 
‘zombies’.2  Even though digital media appear to refute that fear and allow for an overall spectatorship 
that is more participatory I aim to show that the result is often the dialectical opposite, which is 
passive or zombie-like spectatorship. 
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The zombie is an uncanny motif and as such 
is useful for explaining how a viewer performs 
spectatorship. Such a zombie is not based on 
African voodoo or Santeria, but on popular 
screen culture, beginning with George Romero’s 
(1968) films. The motif is currently very popu-
lar in films and television series, such as The 
walking dead (Darabont 2010), and other media 
including phone applications and the like. This 
article is not an account of the horror genre, 
but I apply the zombie as a metaphor, to spec-
tatorship of screen media in general. Ironically, 
screen spectators may often find themselves 
looking at content on screens that are about 
zombies in the horror genre, such as those examples mentioned above. This makes for an interesting 
parody of their situation in those cases, but this article is not about those cases either. The argument 
is rather focused on the passivity of spectatorship of screen media. Despite the fact that there are 
aspects of spectatorship that appear active, as a zombie appears alive or even human, spectatorship 
seems to remain a set of automatic and ‘programmed’ reactions. 
Although I have mentioned the uncanny above, this aspect of spectatorship is only revealed in the 
moment the spectator sees himself as passive, notices he is passive, and becomes conscious of 
his passivity. Such a moment is not conceived of as part of spectatorship, and it only occurs by 
mistake. In this moment of spectatorship (or the interruption or rupture thereof) there is repulsion 
from one’s physical body, from the programmed brain which seems not to belong to oneself, from 
the screen as an object, and from the passive body as an object. In order to avoid this confrontation 
with oneself behaving like a zombie one needs to be distracted from it. Cinemas (and other screens) 
create the conditions necessary to avoid this moment. The irony is that these conditions such as 
darkness, sitting still, looking and listening rather than moving, the suspension of disbelief and so 
forth, in turn enhance a more passive mode of spectatorship. These conditions are therefore hidden 
by other effects, such as affective spectator response brought on by extreme sensual stimulation 
(Gunning [2004:862-876] calls this ‘curiositas’), and interactive interfaces, allowing for choices in 
spectatorship. The viewer is not encouraged to consciously consider their effects as there is a lack 
of contemplative distance between the spectator and the screen (Virilio 1997:29-32). Many films 
and television series even go so far as to deconstruct the notion of authorship, revealing plot structure, 
making editing visible, or supplementing the film with websites, blogs, and even mobile phone 
applications (Daly 2010:81-98). These rather postmodern devices (Kando 1996) simulate spectator 
participation to an extent, allowing the spectator to feel empowered, but I would like to argue that 
these devices often result in a more passive mode of spectatorship.
Figure 1:  Screen shot from Night of the living 
dead, directed by G Romero. 1968. 
 (Wikipedia 2013).
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Which screens?
Screen media are diverse and as Andrew Darley (2000:188) points out there are distinct differences 
between the kinds of spectatorship they engender. What I aim to investigate here are the things 
that they have in common, namely the passive aspects of spectatorship. Cinema or film screens, 
which are projected, as well as analogue television screens, and the current proliferation of digital 
screens all engender a spectatorship which appears in some aspects more participatory than passive, 
but which I argue, conceal the fact that the spectator is expected to behave in very specific ways, 
quite automatically and distractedly, within the limitations of the medium or the context of the content 
represented. 
The argument here is not one which seeks to individually discuss each of the media mentioned 
before. Nellie Oudshoorn and Trevor Pinch (2003) begin to do so, and Friedrich Kittler (2012) writes 
about the evolution of what he calls ‘optical media’, and the power relationships they facilitate, create 
or are influenced by. This paper does not consist of such a detailed analysis, but I rather focus on 
the nature of seemingly participatory spectatorship which applies in part to most screen media. 
Many media reference each other in their appearance and content. Kittler (2012) and Anne Friedberg 
(2004:914-926) both argue that the content of each screen medium is really another medium, referring 
to Marshall McLuhan’s ‘the medium is the message’. Lev Manovich (2001) also discusses digital 
screen media as referencing film, and film referencing theatre. In this manner it has been argued 
that television, and digital screens, reference the projected screens of cinema, and to my mind the 
spectatorship it engenders follows suit. 
Felicity Colman (2009:1-3) writes about the cinematic condition in society which shapes experience 
and forms of knowledge. She applies this condition to many technological forms that are screen 
media, such as mentioned above. While one cannot generalise a condition of spectatorship to all of 
these screens, as I have said, it is important to note that there is a contemporary ‘screen-ness’ even 
in representations that are not displayed on screens. Paul Virilio (1997:45) writes about this condition 
as related to kinematic energy; or image energy. He says that images transmitted through electro-mag-
netic means have altered reception of both analogue and digital media. For him digital screen media 
have changed the conditions of perception as a whole. In concurrence with this my understanding 
of spectatorship of screen media is that it is influenced by and influences non-screen based media in 
turn, and that it exists as a condition of perception which is related to passive spectatorship. 
A dialectical approach
As mentioned much has been made in the study of visual culture, aesthetics and new media studies, 
as well as in postmodern theory, of authorial autonomy, spectatorship and a move towards interpreting 
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spectatorship as a role imbued with some agency. Oudshoorn and Pinch (2003:1-28) discuss how 
one needs to see spectatorship (or users) as neither fully active nor passive, but along a continuum 
between these two positions. Such an argument does not understand spectatorship of screens as 
a contemporary ‘condition’, and fails to interrogate the simulated character of spectatorship. While 
there undoubtedly appears to be more agency in interacting with screens than Kracauer, Benjamin 
and Adorno foresaw, this spectatorship does not seem to be founded upon agency, but upon the 
simulation of agency. The closest model for understanding how this works, is to apply Jean 
Baudrillard’s3 (1984) theory of the simulacrum. His theory is often applied to the content of screen 
media, to the medium itself, and here, to the spectatorship it demands. This spectatorship is an act 
that is itself simulated, it is lodged in repetition and programmed responses, not in authenticity 
(Benjamin 2004). 
Adorno and Horkheimer’s (2003:31-41) well-known argument around the dialectic of the Enlighten-
ment is that the Enlightenment was thought to lead to the liberation of people from the so-called en-
slavement of mythological ignorance; the enchanted world of nature and religion. Instead, the thinking 
of the Enlightenment created a ‘second nature’, an administered world, which enslaved people anew 
to their own reason and knowledge of the world. I apply this manner of argument to spectatorship of 
screen media, in that spectatorship aims to be participatory but really succeeds in becoming more 
passive; it is a dialectical relationship, and not one which occurs along a continuum of development 
towards either more or less passivity or participation. While I am not arguing that spectators are ig-
norant dupes (Allen 1993:21), mindlessly absorbing ideological content they are given, or mistaking 
reality on screen for reality itself, this is mostly because spectatorship conceals its true dynamic and 
simulates agency. 
The uncanny
Before discussing how participatory spectatorship may be simulated in screen media it is useful to 
briefly clarify my interpretation of the uncanny. Steven Johnson (1997:30) writes that screens are so 
much a part of contemporary life that to question their legitimacy would be to question the laws of 
physics. Screens are an inevitable part of contemporary existence. This familiarity is interesting in 
the context of the unheimliche as Freud (1955:1-4) discusses it. He theorises the uncanny as something 
familiar, which becomes unfamiliar. His discussion of the notion centres upon the word heimlich, 
which refers to all that is homely, familiar, and comforting. This environment also, strangely, has 
connotations of things that are private, secret or hidden, and should not come to light. These things 
could be shameful or even abject. As such the word heimlich has connotations which refer to things 
that are familiar and comfortable – but also things that are contrary or dialectical to that, strange 
and monstrous – and should be kept hidden. Heimlich and unheimlich are thus similar in meaning. 
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The uncanny is the unfamiliar and strange lurking within the familiar and banal. One could argue 
that the familiar becomes uncanny because in its familiarity it was transparent or invisible. Only 
when it appears as legible does it appear uncanny or strange. Examples of this include things that 
are inanimate that seem to be alive, or things that are alive but seem dead, such as zombies; dead 
human bodies that behave as if alive. Screen spectatorship is a familiar activity. It is so familiar that 
spectators easily react automatically towards screens (Introna & Ilharco 2006:57-76). One knows 
that they are for looking at and one is used to expecting specific information from specific screens. 
One is not overly aware of performing this recognition and the behaviour it calls for – but one may 
enter into spectatorship without second thought. Only when spectatorship becomes ‘strange’ does 
one see its uncanny aspect – that one is not the interactive, engaged and discerning spectators one 
thinks, but rather resembles a passive zombie. 
Are zombies uncanny? Yes, in short, they were mentioned by Freud (1955:13) as the return of the 
dead, and also occur in the horror film and television genres as such (Allen 1993; Mitchell 2005:55). 
Because a zombie used to be a human being; it used to be one’s neighbour, mother or even even-
tually oneself, it is the familiar that has become monstrous and strange. As such one could argue 
that all things familiar (heimlich), contain the potential to become unheimlich, as Freud explains. 
To my thinking it is this familiarity spectators have with screen media that allows them to slip into 
spectatorship so easily, and without a thought. A rupture needs to take place in this familiarity, and 
the seamlessness between the illusion on screen and lived reality off screen. Only such a rupture 
may make the spectator aware of his behaviour as un-familiar, not normal but strange, and indeed 
even uncanny. How this rupture may take place is discussed in the next section. 
‘Curiositas’ and the collapse of contemplative distance
Gunning (2004:862-870) writes about film in the late nineteenth century, such as the screening of 
Lumière’s Arrival of a train at the station. He investigates the popular notion that people reacted 
as if a real train was arriving in the cinema, coming to life from out of the screen. He argues that 
this is not in fact naïveté that underpinned spectator response but rather there was a climate of 
awe and astonishment around new technologies. As such what probably caused spectators to 
react in this manner was their astonishment at the movement of the image. He argues that in the 
nineteenth century technologies of representation catered to an appetite for astonishment, which 
allowed spectators to be enthralled by films that had little narrative depth or meaning. He applies 
the theory of ‘curiositas’, written about by Augustine in the fifth century (Gunning 2004:871). This 
‘lust of the eyes’ draws the spectator towards things that are not necessarily beautiful, but which 
might be fascinating, even morbidly, such as a depiction of a corpse. This is a lust for seeing for 
its own sake. Gunning calls this the ‘aesthetic of attractions’, and argues that early short films 
were technically dazzling spectacles of little meaning or depth of engagement. He posits them 
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as engendering a spectatorship completely opposed to the modern notions of artistic reception, 
which relied on detached contemplation (such as the Cartesian model formulates). This theory 
roughly correlates with Benjamin’s (2004:797-798) theory of aura and its destruction in reproducible 
media such as film, which according to Benjamin were produced for ‘exhibition value’, to be viewed 
en masse, rather than to be contemplated. 
Many contemporary films could be argued to employ this appeal to the spectators’ lust for spectacle. 
Special effects and post-production, IMAX theatres and 3D cinema are but a few examples. Although I 
cannot argue that all screen media are merely reliant upon an aesthetic of attractions, this aesthetic 
seems to be enabled by ‘new media’. The instantaneous and overwhelming thrill often in turn allows 
the historical and contemporary spectator to feel a very heightened response, bringing him closer 
to the ‘action’. Gunning (2004:873) argues that the need for heightened reactions was a result of the 
overwhelming nature of modern urban life in nineteenth century society. Gunning cites Kracauer 
(2004:873) as writing about modern loss of fulfilling experience. Kracauer (1987:91-96) discusses 
1920s picture palaces (film houses or cinemas) as displaying fragments of sense impressions, snip-
Figure 2:  Screen shot from television series The walking dead, produced by F Darabont. 2010. 
(amctv 2013).
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pets of spectacle to be consumed. Kracauer (1987) writes about this manner of film spectatorship as 
one of distraction, and this is later developed by Benjamin (2006:800-811) in his discussion of the loss 
of the aura of authenticity in film representation. 
Film, television and other screens also anticipate the viewer’s reactions. This happens through genre, 
cinematography, direction, and programming, whether of software, interface or content. In the case 
of film, for example, the text is composed to elicit certain responses from the viewer. The viewer in 
turn feels his responses to be unique and genuine, although in truth, they only feel authentic. Film 
as medium is constructed to elicit or create affective responses in viewers (Tarkovsky cited by Grau 
2003:153). In this manner film predicts and even constructs audience response. Specific and 
regulated response is required in order for this mass medium to be successful (Manovich 2006); 
spectators should laugh at comedic films, and feel fear in horror films. 
Spectatorship of film furthermore engenders a relationship to its illusionism which Richard Allen 
(1993:40-42) terms ‘projective illusion’. This form of illusion entails that the spectator projects himself 
into the ‘world’ on the screen. The device allows the viewer to feel as if he or she is genuinely 
interacting with the screen. It corresponds to the suspension of disbelief – but also amounts to the 
suspension of reality outside the screen. This means that parts of physical reality are consciously 
ignored in order for the viewer to participate in the projective illusion on screen. It is this device 
which happens in a distracted manner, automatically. Film does not require the viewer to ponder it. 
As the image is continuously changing the viewer has no time to contemplate individual images or 
indeed the act of spectatorship itself. The viewer’s thoughts are continuously directed by the visual 
input. Manovich (2006) also discusses how film allows large groups of spectators to share the same 
‘thoughts’, as depicted in the films they are collectively seeing as audiences. Kafka (cited by Virilio 
1997: 91) says that watching a film is like pulling a uniform over one’s eyes. It is lack of awareness 
of this process which allows spectatorship of contemporary screens to seem ‘new’ and active, 
compared to spectatorship of older screen media such as early film. 
Considering the metaphor of the zombie for contemporary screen spectatorship one may argue 
that the ‘curiositas’ of the aesthetic of attractions is comparable to the lust zombies have for living 
human flesh. Zombies automatically devour all living beings they stumble upon. The automatic 
consumption of screened images may be compared to this bloodlust which satisfies no real hunger 
in a zombie. One may find oneself watching a screen even though one has no specific need to, it 
happens without conscious consideration. Adorno and Horkheimer (2003:37-39) argue that in the 
cycle of consumption of the aestheticised world through mass media, audience response is auto-
mated and desire is simulated – it is a parody. They refer to canned laughter as an example of the 
false satisfaction promised by the medium in the genre of the television sitcom. One could understand 
this through the dynamic of the gaze – pivoting around the power and desire experienced by the 
spectator in looking through the manufactured gaze of the film (Mulvey 2004:833-844). The desire 
  | 35 Number 22, 2013 ISSN 1020 1497
is never met by the representation on screen, and as Adorno and Horkheimer (2003:37-39) say, the 
spectator must be satisfied with ‘the menu’. 
Adorno and Horkheimer (2003) also argue that film encourages the viewer to see the world outside 
of the film representation as a continuation of what is depicted on screen. The more technically 
convincing the reality on screen is, the more this is achieved. Screen media are constantly improving 
the credibility of representational quality, approaching and even transcending the credibility of reality. 
An example of this is High Definition television and CGI effects, allowing the representation to be 
seen even more closely than the naked human eye could perceive in life. Paul Virilio (1997:50) writes 
about visual technologies altering and biologically invading the human eye, seeking to eradicate the 
distance between the eye and the screen. He writes about lasers being projected into the corneas 
of pilots’ eyes, and laser technology correcting errors in eyesight. Benjamin (2004:795) writes about 
the urge of contemporary (then 1930s) audiences to bring things closer. The aesthetic of attractions 
feeds this urge, which persists in spectatorship of contemporary screen media.  
Virilio (1997:22-32) writes about the contemporary collapse of distance between spectator and 
representation beyond what it is to aesthetic distance, as a conditions affecting perception as a 
whole. He uses the metaphor of a sky diver, free falling towards earth. He refers to the account of 
one such a sky diver, who recounts his visual impressions of earth as it appears to rush up to meet 
him during the free fall. At one point, the diver says that the horizon appears to rush upwards so fast 
that it splits apart, and perspectival distance makes no more sense, but rather disintegrates into distinct 
impressions rushing past. For Virilio (1997:44-45) the advent of the transmission of representations 
via electro-magnetic media marks a new paradigm of perception, where Alberti’s window and Re-
naissance perspective no longer apply. He argues that the instant transmission of visual representa-
tion allows for distance to collapse in effect, as distance from an object no longer affects vision. Via 
television for example, one may see a live (‘real time’) representation of something on the other side 
of the globe. As such, distance has radically shrunk, and vision ‘travels’ at the speed of light. This 
extreme collapse of distance is implicit not only in screen media or digital screen media, but has 
affected perception to the point that distance is always potentially instantaneously traversable. It 
makes sense that contemplative distance, as it belongs to the Cartesian subject, thus also collapses 
in contemporary spectatorship. The concern that arises from this is whether a spectator confronted 
with such a complete inundation, or swallowing of distance from the represented world, may be 
thought of as active or meaningfully engaging with representation. Virilio (1997:22-34) thinks of this 
spectator as the ultimate sedentary type, who controls his world as if he is disabled, without physi-
cally moving. If Benjamin’s theory of the collapse of distance is applied here, it would seem that such 
a spectator could only be more distracted, as the screen moves from ‘in situ’ to ‘in vivo’, coming closer 
and closer until it enters the body (Virilio 1997:92). For Virilio (1997) vision has become so ubiquitous 
that he says it is industrialised, and he also uses the term Gunning uses, ‘eye lust’. For Virilio vision is 
not a choice, but it is also not something one is forced to experience, it happens automatically. 
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Rupturing spectatorship
Like nineteenth-century cinema audiences, contemporary spectators of screen media expect to 
be dazzled. Gunning (2004:36-48) also writes about old technologies seeking to make themselves 
new or uncanny in order to break the cycle of them becoming ‘second nature’ and ordinary. The 
modern association of technology with things that are novel or innovative, inevitably ends in these 
technologies becoming banal. The concept of ‘second nature’ is indicative of how technologies 
become ‘normal’, and also of how they form part of the ‘administered world’, or culture industry as 
theorised by the Frankfurt School (Adorno & Horkheimer 2003). According to Gunning (2004:42) all 
modern technologies become familiar at some point, and astonishment subsides into an automatic 
relationship with these technologies. Technologies may challenge this familiarisation, and become 
strange again. Mitchell (2005:26) refers to Bruno Latour who says that modern technologies (such 
as screen media in my interpretation) have not liberated us from mystery; rather, they are complex 
new life forms full of mystery, ‘they have made communication seem more transparent, interactive 
and rational’, but they have also ensured that we are ensnared in their matrices and networks of 
images, objects, identities and rituals. Spectatorship is more zombie-like now than it was thought 
to be even for early film’s audiences, because contemporary spectators feel themselves as having 
overcome that earlier passive spectatorship. This false sense of agency is thanks to postmodern 
ideas around spectatorship, but which are to my mind not fully realised in contemporary screen 
media spectatorship. 
How does the uncanny aspect of spectatorship then come to light? If it does take place at all it 
may happen through a rupture in spectatorship as I have mentioned. There are times when screens 
manifest as objects rather than as screens. In touch screens such as tablets this may happen more 
easily in the course of interaction. When one notices the surface of the screen itself it becomes a 
strange object. In interacting with a tablet its own ‘objectness’ interferes with its illusionistic functions. 
As its surface manifests as tangible it becomes a film dividing two realities, as a window divides 
two spaces. The window is not supposed to be visible as a barrier, but rather a transparent opening 
‘into’ representation. If the screen is covered in fingerprint smears for example, the spectator may 
experience a sense of being trapped by this film, as a bird that flies into a window. 
In order to prevent a rupture in spectatorship screens are always attempting to hide themselves as 
objects. They become flatter, more transparent, and frameless. Their surfaces have even become 
integrated with key pads in touch screen phones and tablets. Screens also become ‘visible’ when 
they do not function correctly. Heidegger (cited by Gunning 2004:45-46) made the same argument 
with reference to tools as technologies that hide themselves. When a phone malfunctions it becomes 
a useless object, and this is what Gunning refers to as uncanny. I take his argument further, for in that 
moment not only the phone, but also the user, become strangely useless. The spectator is performing 
pointless motions of spectatorship, or is attempting to. Any screen is potentially doing this with any 
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spectator or user. It is possible to extend the argument to spectatorship as a whole. The moment of 
malfunction, or any moment which interrupts spectatorship, when the lights are switched on in the 
cinema, or when an advertisement interrupts a television broadcast, ruptures the distraction brought 
about by spectatorship of screen media, and its dialectical aspect may be revealed. Supposed 
activity may then reveal itself as passivity. Perhaps the physical body of the spectator itself encroaches 
upon so-called participative spectatorship, because the body is often (though not always) required 
to be ignored or to behave passively or repetitively. I am not implying here that interruption in 
spectatorship can make it more active, but that ‘rupture’ reveals spectatorship as uncanny, rather 
than ‘natural’.
Interactivity
Kristen Daly (2010:81-95) argues that contemporary cinema allows the spectator to play a more active 
role in the construction of meaning from film than when the medium was first theorised by Kracauer 
and Benjamin. She asserts that film narrative for example, is deconstructed in such a manner that 
in contemporary film much of the narrative meaning is (re) constructed by reference to external 
sources such as websites, DVDs, music, other films and so forth. Her argument is that this allows 
the spectator of film to be active - an author of sorts, rather than a passive viewer. I disagree with 
her fundamentally, since it is the simulated aspect of the interaction with the screen medium itself, 
as well as the construction of the film content in editing and directing, which results in the passive 
spectator, regardless of the number of platforms over which this is distributed. While making meaning 
by using external references seems interactive, it is a formulaic simulating of interactivity. The viewer 
cannot but obey the cues of the medium, regardless of the number of screens encompassed. 
Daly (2010:82) expands on her argument by referring to the ideas of David Rodowick saying that 
contemporary spectators of digital electronic media are no longer passive viewers, but alternate 
between reading, looking and immersive viewing. These are, according to him, overlapping ways 
of interacting with media, and he asserts that digital users have been trained by their dealings 
with digital media to interact with, and participate in all that they consume. As I have mentioned 
previously, I agree that screen media spectatorship has altered the manner in which spectators 
consume other representational media which are not screen-based. Daly (2010:81-98) goes on to 
interpret Rodowick and Thomas Elsaesser’s ideas around the notion of game play as spectatorship 
of digital media. Elsaesser writes about a ‘new’ form of cinema which allows the spectator more 
interactivity, based on play and the construction of non-obvious relationships between things. Daly 
argues that narrative is now waning in favour of a form of cinema where navigation, inter-textual 
links and ‘figuring out the rules of the game ‘are more important than a narrative structure. She calls 
this form of the medium ‘Cinema 3.0’ (Daly 2010:81). 
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Part of this new cinematic condition (to apply Colman’s terminology), are seemingly postmodern 
devices (Kando 1996) such as the notion of re-mix, intertextuality, and things being left ‘unfinished’. 
Daly writes about the spectator as participant in a community of ‘fans’, often forming their own 
groups and online discussion groups or blogs around the films and television series they are engaged 
in. The walking dead (Darabont 2010), a series based on a post-apocalyptic America brought about 
by the outbreak of a zombie virus, is a good example of how this works. While I reiterate that this 
paper is not a case study about the series and its depiction of the zombie motif, it serves as a relevant 
example of the form of spectatorship Daly refers to. 
The series has been airing on the American channel AMC. Several factors distinguish the spectatorship 
it engenders from television series prior to the advent of digital media. The series is supplemented by 
a large and very engaging website. The site provides many things for ‘fans’ to engage with; press 
releases, interviews with the actors from the series, and importantly, many high definition photographs 
from the shooting of the series. Special effects make-up is revealed and aspects of the plot are 
Figure 3: Screen shot from television series The walking dead, produced by Darabont. 2010. 
(amctv 2012).
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discussed. There are also ‘trailers’ for upcoming seasons and ‘teasers’ about episodes. Spectators 
may download high definition wallpapers for computer or mobile phone as well. With such a myriad 
activities and modes of engagement, as well as the revelation of some of the construction of the 
series (such as behind-the-scenes photographs and interviews), it seems that Daly’s argument is 
perfectly applicable, although I question it. 
There is certainly more expected of this spectator, having to make intertextual links, finish parts of the 
narrative for himself (or herself), and create his own version of the future plot to an extent. Spectators 
also get ‘closer’ to the series than ever before, being able to download photographs, and have them 
as wallpapers on their computers and phones. An aspect that I did not mention above, which 
complicates spectatorship even more is the phenomenon of downloading films and television series 
from torrent websites. This allows fans to download and watch series in succession, for example, 
without the weekly delay of television broadcasting. This manner of engaging with media is illegal, but 
it is a reality, and adds another level of ‘agency’ to screen spectatorship. 
While I do not disagree that the strategies employed by television producers and by spectators 
themselves has broadened the range of spectatorial modes for digital screen media, and by 
default even analogue or projected screen media, there are aspects to this argument that are of 
concern. Darley (2000:156-173) writes about the spectatorship engendered by computer games, as 
a form of screen-based spectatorship. He discusses the notion of interactivity as the spectator having 
agency in affecting or being affected by what occurs in the representation on screen. He argues 
that screen media spectatorship is always dependent upon the parameters of the content. This is 
pre-programmed as a limited set of options available to the user, which translate differently across 
media platforms. Films are limited in that the spectator has no control over playback, for example. 
The film cannot be paused at any point. Television allows the spectator some control over the lighting 
in the space, the volume of the set and so forth. One may also change the channel, but one cannot 
watch episodes on demand. Computer games offer many more inputs, but always subject the user to 
‘rules’ or limitations of the game. No matter how interactive the medium appears, it remains subject 
to a set of programmed limitations. According to Darley (and I have been making a similar argument 
above), these limitations are disguised by what he terms vicarious ‘kinaesthesia’ (Darley 2000:155-157). 
The viewer feels sensually overwhelmed and involved, and as such is unaware of the limitations he 
accepts as part of spectatorship. I have discussed ‘curiositas’ or eye lust earlier, which may be 
compared with Darley’s argument using ‘kinesthesia’ here. 
While many contemporary screen media representations strive to heighten the sensuality of the 
encounter with the spectator, through higher definition of the image on screen, super slow motion 
photography, simultaneous camera angles and so forth, this does not entail semantic intensification. 
In game play on digital interfaces, interactivity does not entail in-depth involvement in the game 
play either, but rather an expansion of superficial involvement, which echoes the aesthetic of 
attractions. For Darley (2000:167-168), who also attempts to write about more than one screen 
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medium, all these media have in common that they seek to provide direct visual and corporeal 
stimulation. Visual treatments of digital images have become rife. It is possible to apply filters and 
effects even to photographs taken on smart phones through applications like Instagram and 
Hipstamatic. These gradings or filters are also applied to television series and films, and any digital 
images. This reinforces Darley’s notion that content is often less important and, little interpretation or 
semantic resonance takes place. Spectatorship is less an activity of hermeneutic meaning making, 
than one of a sensual stimulation and distraction. 
One may return to Benjamin’s (2004:795) notion of film allowing audiences to bring the world 
closer through representation, collapsing the distance engendered by the spectatorship of the 
Cartesian position, which required the viewer to contemplate what he saw. The interactive spectator 
thus does everything but contemplate, he or she is far too busy being distracted by all the options 
offered. Although the spectator may now be expected to perform roles of authorship, all of these are 
programmed, in turn ‘programming’ spectatorship. 
The programmed aspect of media also constitutes the simulated aspect, since media conceal that 
aspect of themselves from spectators. Parts of the programming may be revealed, such as mentioned 
above in the example of behind-the-scenes makeup shots of actors in the series The walking dead. 
This is a foil, however, for far more remains concealed, especially regarding the process of 
spectatorship. The existence of the website that accompanies this television series predicts that 
viewers will visit the website, and so ‘expand’ their engagement with the series in a manner directed 
by the medium. Elseasser (cited by Daly 2010:98) warns that expansion across platforms often serves 
as a far broader base from which to market commercial offerings such as television series, rather 
than developing a more ‘active’ spectator. 
Conclusion 
I have argued above that digital media, and by extension screen media of different kinds are often 
thought of as engendering a particular form of spectatorship which is active and lends some agency 
to the spectator. Many theorists draw links between digital media and older screen media such as 
projected film, such as Virilio, Daly and Darley. For these authors it seems that spectatorship has 
changed from the time of nineteenth century cinema. My argument above has been that spectatorship 
and perception, have indeed been altered by a cinematic condition in society (Colman 2009:1-2). This 
condition is not as liberating as it seems to be however, for spectatorship remains rather programmed 
and passive in its relation to meaning making, and in this way is not so different to historical cinema 
spectatorship. The contemporary spectator is overwhelmed and stimulated by screen media, and 
expects to be so, leading to a distracted form of spectatorship, rather than a sense of agency. 
This distraction is exacerbated by the extreme collapse of distance between the spectator and the 
screen in the broadcasting and instantaneous nature of digital screen media (Virilio 1997). 
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While a spectator of contemporary screen media may feel sensually stimulated, and challenged to 
make some links of his or her own between various screen platforms, he or she has no space or 
time to contemplate the performance of spectatorship. As such, the Cartesian position of spectatorship 
is subverted, but it does not result in spectatorship which is more emancipated than that. Instead 
the spectator becomes zombie-like, performing automatic reactions and interactions with screen 
media. Although he is free (in a postmodern sense) from the constraints and flaws of the Cartesian 
position, he is only free to act within specific and predictable parameters. 
The spectator is not only limited, but is also not aware of that fact. Only when the performance of 
spectatorship is interrupted may the spectator recognise himself as a stranger, in an uncanny 
moment. This moment is avoided at all cost by screen media, resulting in a dialectical play of 
spectatorship, where more ‘activity’ and interactivity leads to less active spectatorship, through 
more kinaesthetic stimulation, or ‘curiositas’ (Gunning 2004:871-872). As stated above, my argument 
does not write spectators off as victims of the media, but rather sees them as simulating an active 
spectatorship that is often assumed to be already established and flawless. In this manner spectators 
are zombie-like, in that their supposed interactive activities are to some extent as programmed and 
as reliant on sensual over stimulation as the antiquated ‘cinema of attractions’ was.
NOTES
1  The Cartesian position was formulated by thinkers such as Kant, as embodying Enlightenment thinking 
around the unified subject. The latter understands the world around him through employing logic 
and empirical knowledge. The Cartesian position also allows for art or in fact an object of any kind, 
to deliver a ‘truth’ or decisive message to the spectator, who is merely the recipient of the message, 
as created or formulated by an author in the vein of the Romantic genius. As such this view is often 
criticised in postmodern theory, for neglecting the viewpoints of those ‘Othered’ in modernity, such 
as women, or racial minorities. Tom Kando (1996:3-33) succinctly summarises the major movements 
addressing the problematic aspects of this position. Kevin Hart (2004) also summarises postmodern 
theory, explaining that the very nature of reality is questionable in postmodern contexts, since the 
rational Cartesian world is called into question. The Cartesian position sees the world in a totalitarian 
manner, as logical, knowable, and subject to human faculties. It relies on critical or contemplative 
distance, allowing the viewer or subject to objectively observe what he is looking at, through conscious 
contemplation. 
2  Williams discusses the fear of technology as a fear of the dehumanisation of people in a technological 
world, with reference to the film Blade Runner, directed by Ridley Scott (1982). The film problematises 
the humanity or lack thereof of human characters in a fictional future, where humans are being man-
ufactured through genetic manipulation. In the film the human characters lack vigour and indeed 
compassion, and appear quite zombie-like, going through life rather automatically. 
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3  Baudrillard (1984:2) writes extensively about the orders of simulacra. He argues that simulacra do not 
attempt to posit themselves as real, but call reality into question. Baudrillard’s orders of simulacra are 
summarised by Michael Camille (1996:39) as follows. Simulacra first reflect the ‘real’, then mask it, and 
finally substitute themselves for the real. When something is simulated it means that it bears no reference 
to an original it is a copy of, thus one may simulate being ill, without having an illness. 
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